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Abstract—User errors while performing security-critical tasks
can lead to undesirable or even disastrous consequences. One
major factor influencing mistakes and failures is complexity of
such tasks, which has been studied extensively in prior research.
Another important issue which hardly received any attention
is the impact of both accidental and intended distractions
on users performing security-critical tasks. In particular, it is
unclear whether, and to what extent, unexpected sensory cues
(e.g., auditory or visual) can influence user behavior and/or
trigger mistakes. Better understanding of the effects of intended
distractions will help clarify their role in adversarial models.
As part of the research effort described in this paper, we
administered a range of naturally occurring – yet unexpected –
sounds while study participants attempted to perform a security-
critical task. We found that, although these auditory cues lowered
participants’ failure rates, they had no discernable effect on their
task completion times. To this end, we overview some relevant
literature that explains these somewhat counter-intuitive findings.
Conducting a thorough and meaningful study on user errors
requires a large number of participants, since errors are typically
infrequent and should not be instigated more than once per
subject. To reduce the effort of running numerous subjects, we
developed a novel experimental setup that was fully automated
and unattended. We discuss our experience with this setup and
highlight the pros and cons of generalizing its usage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our world is a noisy and distracting place, where truly quiet
or sterile environments are rare. Most people are accustomed
to some degree of auditory and visual distraction in their
daily lives. However, they may be influenced in an unexpected
manner by sudden distractions, especially if they occur during
performance of a task that demands concentration.
Meanwhile, modern technology allows – and sometimes
requires – people to engage in security-critical tasks in pub-
lic settings, while being subjected to various degrees and
types of sensory input. As personal wireless devices (mainly
smartphones) become more ubiquitous, the average person
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grows more reliant on them for the performance of security
tasks, such as entering a PIN, Bluetooth pairing or verifying
transaction amounts. For example, in online fund transfers,
one has to compare the displayed amount and currency to the
intended amount and currency [1]. In device pairing, one needs
to compare items (such as numbers, text, pictures, or sounds),
or perform some physical task over an “out of band” (OOB)
channel [2].
All these tasks require some form of human involvement,
which represents the weakest link and determines overall
security [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. This motivates extensive
usability studies to assess human ability to routinely complete
security tasks that still provide an acceptable level of security.
There has been a lot of research on this topic [3], [4], but very
little work only that investigates user errors and maliciously
induced user errors. One major reason for the dearth of prior
work in this area is the difficulty of conducting traditional user
experiments. Since human errors in such cases are relatively
rare, it would take many trials with many subjects to obtain
statistically reliable information about the failure rate, and to
determine whether the difference in rates between two methods
is statistically significant.1 The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that more than one method needs to be tested, while
at the same time, only one attempt should be made per
study participant to trigger a mistake (since subjects may
otherwise become alerted to such attempts, consciously or
subconsciously). For all these reasons, the total number of
subjects needed for an experiment to study user mistakes in
security-related tasks can quickly grow into the hundreds.
To mitigate the effort needed to conduct such large studies,
we designed a setup for an entirely unattended experiment,
wherein subjects receive recorded instructions from a life-size,
video-projected, rather than ”live”, experimenter. As a first
experiment in this environment, we decided to test the error
rate of subjects attempting to pair two Bluetooth devices in the
presence of unexpected audio stimuli. We tested 147 subjects
in this environment with no experimenter involvement. Our
original expectation was that unexpected audio interference
would have a negative impact on the completion of security-
critical tasks. However, surprisingly, it turned out that noise
actually had a facilitatory effect.
Organization: Section II describes related work. Then, Section
III presents the design and setup of our experiments. It is
followed by Section IV which presents experimental results.
Next, Sections V and VI summarize lessons learned from
this experience and discuss conclusions, respectively. Section
1See Appendix.
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VII acknowledges certain limitations of our approach. Then,
Section VIII addresses ethical considerations and Section
IX concludes the paper with the discussion of future work.
Appendix A provides a brief overview of statistical methods
used and Appendix B demonstrates the unattended experiment
setup.
II. RELATED WORK
This section overviews related work in three areas: (1)
automated experiments, (2) human-assisted security methods,
and (3) effects of noise on human task performance.
A. Automated Experiments
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no prior
usability study utilizing a fully automated (unattended) exper-
imental setup with a video-projected experimenter. However,
there have been precedents with virtually attended experiments
and unattended online surveys, in many fields, most notably,
psychology. There is a sizable body of work supporting validity
and precision of such unattended online experiments, as com-
pared to more traditional attended experiments in a lab setting.
In particular, Ollesch et al. [8] found no significant difference
in psychometric data collected from an attended experiment
in a lab setting and its online, virtually attended counterpart.
This is further supported by Riva et al. [9] in the comparison
of data collected from unattended online and attended offline
questionnaires. Guidelines for creating the best possible draw
from the intended population base are provided by Birnbaum
[10]. Finally, Lazem and Gracanin [11] replicated two classical
social psychology experiments, where the experimenter and
the three participants were represented as avatars in Second
Life instead of being physically co-present. The outcomes were
very similar.
However, all aforementioned studies assume that an unat-
tended or virtually attended experiment occurs online. There
appears to be no prior work involving an offline, unattended
experimental setup.
B. User Studies of Security Protocols
Both security and usability experts have extensively studied
secure device pairing. In this setting, wireless devices have no
prior knowledge of one another and, hence, there is no pre-
existing security context. This is further complicated by the
inability to rely on either a common Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) or a mutually Trusted Third Party (TTP). This accentu-
ates threats of man-in-the-middle (MitM) or ”evil twin” attacks
during the pairing protocol. Consequently, involvement of a
human user has been proposed, in order to verify (over a low-
bandwidth OOB channel) message integrity of the protocol
that transpires over the normal channel.
For example, Short Authentication String (SAS) protocols
require a user to compare two short strings, of about 20 bits
each [12]. Since accurate task completion was found to be
relatively difficult for human users, alternative protocols were
developed.
The first usability study of pairing techniques was carried
out by Uzun et al. [13]. That study determined that the most
accurate way to compare a pair of SAS was the ”compare and
confirm” method, wherein the user would be presented an SAS
by both of the machines they are trying to pair, and would be
to asked to confirm whether or not the two SASs match.
Goodrich et al. [1] introduced an authentication technique
that utilized a “Mad-Lib” type structure, where participating
devices, based on the protocol outcome, compose a nonsensical
phrase out of several short English words. The human user is
then tasked with determining whether the two devices came up
with matching phrases. This technique was found to be easier
to complete by non-specialist users.
Kobsa et al. [2] reported on a comprehensive comparative
usability study of eleven major secure device pairing methods,
measuring task performance times, task completion rates, per-
ceived security and perceived usability. The main outcome was
the grouping of the investigated methods into three clusters,
following a principal components analysis.
Kainda et al. [4] examined usability of device pairing in a
group setting, where up to 6 users tried to connect their devices
to one another, and found that group effort decreased the
expected rate of security and non-security failures. Although,
an inherent “insecurity of conformity” was also identified,
wherein users would deliberately lie about an observed string
in order to “fit in” with the majority opinion of a group.
Nithyanand et al. [3] also examined the pairing of multiple
devices in a group setting with groups of 4 or 6 members.
They found that groups are nearly immune to insertion attacks,
where an adversary will pretend to be a member of the
group, and thus change the expected SAS for all members.
They also found that groups are particularly vulnerable to a
modified man-in-the-middle attack where a single member of
the group is given false information, and instead of rejecting
their incorrect SAS, they conform to the positive result the rest
of the group reports.
Gallego et al. [14] found that performance on out-of-band
tasks in secure device pairing could be improved through the
addition of a score metric on the user’s performance, resulting
in a considerable reduction in both safe and fatal errors.
There are numerous other results in the area of secure wire-
less device pairing. However, most of them focused on newly
proposed techniques rather than on comparative usability.
C. Impact of Noise on Task Performance
In the field of psychology, there are conflicting results with
respect to the influence of noise on human task performance.
Some experiments claim a positive effect [15], [16], [17],
while others report exactly the opposite [18], [19]. Several
explanations of this phenomenon have been proposed. Initially,
it was thought that the type of noise used was the primary
factor that would cause either an inhibitory or facilitatory
effect. Hockey [15] demonstrated though that this is not the
case, as studies utilizing a diverse range of audio conditions
have reported both possible outcomes.
The subsequent explanation was that task complexity might
have something to with the effect of noise upon the completion
of that task. Hockey [15] and Benignus et al. [19] have shown
that such a causal relationship may exist. Task complexity is
defined by the task’s event rate (i.e., how many elements of
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the task are received within a given period of time), and by the
number of different sources from which these task elements are
received. Tasks that have a low event rate and a low number of
sources are more likely to be facilitated than impaired by the
introduction of noise. In contrast, tasks with high event rates
and many sources are more likely to be impaired by noise. This
hypothesized relationship views noise as a general stimulant
that heightens general sensory arousal: if a subject is at a very
low level of arousal before the introduction of the noise, it can
help sharpen their focus and improve task performance [20],
[21]. However, for a subject who is already at a high level
of sensory arousal, the added stressor can overload them and
introduce errors in task completion [18], [22].
Furthermore, O’Malley and Poplawsky [16] showed that
noise can affect behavioral selectivity. This means that while
noise may not have a consistent positive or negative impact
on task completion in all cases, noise may consistently have a
negative effect on tasks that require the subject to detect signals
in their periphery, and noise may have a consistent positive
effect on task completion when the subject has to focus on
signals coming from the center of their field of attention. This
suggests that, regardless of task complexity, the addition of
noise may narrow a subject’s area of attention.
III. EXPERIMENT
This section describes our experimental setup, procedures
and subject parameters.
A. Apparatus
The setting of our study was carefully designed to facilitate
fully automated experiments with a variety of sensory inputs.
The installation is situated in a low-traffic public space (a wide
corridor corner nook) at the top floor of a large academic
building on a university campus.
Figure 1(a) shows the experimental location from the side,
and Figure 1(b) shows our setup from the subject’s perspective
(front view). It includes a large touch-sensitive Smartboard
with a short-throw projector, a webcam, and two pairs of
speakers (one in front and one behind the intended subject
position), a motion detector, as well as controllable lights and
electricity outlets. The Smartboard is an interactive whiteboard
(see smarttech.com) that gathers input via user’s touch on its
surface. As such, it acts as both the display and the input
device.
Instead of a human experimenter actively curating the
environment and interacting with the subjects, we used a life-
size video/audio recording of an experimenter as a proxy. This
proxy is the subject’s main source of information about the
experiment. In particular, the proxy starts by reading a script
explaining the flow of the experiment. This is shown in Figure
3.
This setup allows for a fully unattended experiment. The
only (and strictly off-line) involvement of an experimenter
amounted to infrequent re-calibration of sound effects and
repair of some components that suffered (minor) damage
throughout the study.
B. Procedures
The goal of the experiment was to measure user errors
when attempting to pair two wireless devices via Bluetooth,
while being exposed to potentially distracting and possibly
“malicious” sound effects. To make the “attack” less notice-
able, we use four sounds that can be encountered in real life,
both in open and enclosed public spaces: (1) a baby crying, (2)
a hammer striking a wall, (3) helicopter rotors spinning, and
(4) a circular saw cutting wood. Reasons for selecting these
four specific sounds as audio stimuli are discussed in Section
VII-B below.
All sounds were played at normal volume from a set of
speakers situated behind the subject. Specific volumes of the
four sounds (measured at a typical subject’s position) were as
follows:
• Baby: 67 dB
• Helicopter: 79 dB
• Hammer: 80 dB
• Saw: 78 dB
Even the highest of these four volumes (80 dB) is well within
the safe range, as defined by the US Occupational Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA) guidelines.2
To begin the experiment, the subject approaches the Smart-
board and presses a large wall-mounted button to the right.
Although a motion-activated start is also possible, we decided
to minimize any disturbance for uninvolved passers-by. Next,
the Smartboard plays a short video recording of our proxy
experimenter, who explains that the subject will be preforming
a task on their own phone, namely, connecting it via Bluetooth
to a nearby device. The latter is actually an iMac desktop in the
office behind the Smartboard; it is not visible to the subject,
as shown in Figure 5. The subject is promised a reward for
the successful completion of the experiment, in the form of a
$5 Amazon coupon. The subject is also briefly informed that
the task of pairing two Bluetooth devices involves comparing
two 6-digit numbers and confirming whether they match, as
shown in Figure 2.
At this point, the subject has a time window of 2 minutes
to correctly pair the devices. Otherwise, a failure message is
read out and displayed. While the subject is in the process of
pairing, one of five events occurs: either silence is maintained
throughout the experiment, or one of the aforementioned four
sounds is played from the speakers located on the ceiling
behind the subject.
A subject who fails the first time and wishes to make
another attempt at pairing, is given the opportunity to re-
try the experiment in another two-minute window. If pairing
completes successfully, a message to that effect is displayed.
At the end, a subject is asked to enter an email address using a
virtual keyboard displayed on the touch-sensitive Smartboard
(see Figure 4), thus allowing us to email the promised Amazon
coupon as a participation reward.
Each subject encountered only one condition. Presenting
subjects with two conditions would have biased their per-
2 OSHA requires all employers to implement a Hearing Conservation
Program where workers are exposed to a time-weighted average noise level
of 85 dB or higher over an 8 hour work shift. Our noise levels were clearly
lower. See: https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/noisehearingconservation/
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Fig. 1. Experimental Setup: (a) Side view (speakers over the door), (b) Front view
formance in the second condition, since, at that point, they
would already know what to do and what might happen.
Since subject observables (errors) are influenced by various
individual characteristics, random subject selection ensures
that any variation between sample and population observables
is only a matter of chance.
After successful completion of the experiment, if the same
subject attempts to repeat the same experiment with the same
personal device, their data is automatically flagged and later
discarded. Multiple participation of the same subject with
different personal devices is identified (and discarded) by
visual inspection of video recordings. The experimental setup
maintains a detailed log of all system events that can later
be analyzed to measure outcomes, such as the number of re-
trials, task success rates, and task completion times, as well as
a video recording of the entire encounter, as shown in Figure
5.
C. Hypotheses
Our initial hypotheses were that introducing noise while an
unsuspecting subject attempts to pair two Bluetooth devices
will have no effect:
H1 We will observe the same error rate
and
H2 The pairing process will take the same amount of time to
complete successfully,
as in the same setting without any noise interference.
D. Subjects
In prior studies on usability of pairing protocols with a
human in the loop [1], [3], [4], it was discovered that a
subject population of 20-25 per condition being tested was an
acceptable size for obtaining statistically significant3 findings.
Since our planned experiment has one condition for each of
the four sound effects as well as one control condition (with
no sound), collecting any meaningful amount of data would
require well over one hundred iterations of the experiment.
3See Appendix for the definition of statistical significance.
To recruit subjects, we posted signs around the entrance
and inside the lobby of a large campus building, which directed
people to the experimental setup and mentioned the reward for
participation. Posters explicitly described that subjects were
sought for a brief ”Usability Study” and did not in any way
mention the security-critical nature of the task to be performed,
or the possibility of any noise interference. The general area
of campus where the experiments were conducted houses
Computer Science and Engineering departments.
Of the total 147 subjects, there were 102 males and 45
females. Most of them (139 out of 147) appeared to be college-
aged (18-24 years), while 8 seemed to belong to a somewhat
older group (30+ years). This demographic breakdown is
influenced by the location of the experiment and by the
recruitment form. Since we solicited participants passively and
since our recruitment posters were located in the ”technical”
part of a large university campus, it is not surprising that the
overwhelming majority of participants were of college age with
the majority being male.
IV. RESULTS
We now discuss the results of the study, starting with data
cleaning and proceeding to task completion results. Statistical
tools used in data analysis are described in the Appendix.
A. Data Cleaning
Subject data was discarded in three cases. First, we re-
moved the instances where participants arrived either in pairs
or larger groups. Their data were eliminated since it might have
been skewed due to social facilitation. It has been shown that
being under observation of others can have a positive impact
on subjects performing tasks of low levels of complexity [23].
Second, a few participants arrived with old-style flip phones.
Such older phones were technically unable to establish a
Bluetooth connection with our client.
All in all, 29 pairs or groups of subjects had to be
discarded, as well as 10 others who attempted to use flip
phones. We could not discern any obvious visual or auditory
impairment in any subject that would be a detriment to the
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experiment. We later visually checked all experiments for
subjects with such impairments and none were identified.
Finally, in discussing results below, we differentiate be-
tween pairings and failures that occurred in the first two-minute
trial window, and those that occurred across all attempts. While
the differences are not large, the former results may capture
those subjects better that have already had some pairing
experience in the past.
B. Task Completion Rate
Table I shows the numbers of subjects whose first attempt
at pairing resulted in a success and failure, respectively, plus
the failure rate for the control condition and each stimulus
condition.
TABLE I. SUBJECT FAILURE RATE, FIRST ATTEMPT ONLY
Stimulus #Successful #Unsuccessful Failure
Subjects Subjects Rate
None (control) 27 13 0.34
Baby 23 1 0.04
Hammering 33 3 0.08
Helicopter 24 1 0.04
Saw 20 2 0.09
Total 127 20 0.14
Table II shows the parameters for the Barnard’s exact
test applied pairwise to the subject failure rate of the control
condition and each stimulus. It shows that differences between
failure rates are statistically significant (p < 0.05) with respect
to all four stimuli. This also holds if one applies a conservative
Bonferroni correction to account for four pairwise comparison
(see the Appendix), which leads us to reject hypothesis H1 in
Section III-C, since the failure rate significantly decreases with
the introduction of noise. Section VI discusses this further.
TABLE II. BARNARD’S EXACT TEST ON SUBJECT FAILURE RATES OF
CONTROL & STIMULI
Stimulus Total Failure Wald Nuisance p
Pairings Rate Statistic Parameter
None(control) 40 0.34 – – –
Baby 24 0.04 2.65 0.95 0.03
Hammering 36 0.08 2.58 0.91 0.01
Helicopter 25 0.04 2.71 0.89 0.01
Saw 22 0.09 2.05 0.84 0.03
Table III shows odds ratios and 95% confidence interval for
each stimulua compared to the control condition. Interestingly,
under this analysis, confidence interval of the Saw condition
includes a possible odds ratio of 1.0. This implies that –
under this method of analysis – it is not statistically significant
at the 95% level. Confidence intervals for other 3 stimuli
reinforce the claim of statistical significance at the 95% level,
as established by Barnard’s exact test.
TABLE III. ODDS RATIO AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
ON SUBJECT FAILURE RATES OF CONTROL AND STIMULI
Stimulus Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
wrt control wrt control
None (control) - –
Baby 0.09 0.01 - 0.74
Hammering 0.18 0.04 - 0.73
Helicopter 0.09 0.01 - 0.71
Saw 0.20 0.04 - 1.02
Table IV shows the total number of pairing attempts that
ended in success (as well as those that failed) across all
pairing trials, and the failure rate for each stimulus (and
control) condition. We note that not every subject who initially
failed chose to re-try. However, every subject who re-tried was
successful the second time.
TABLE IV. FAILURE RATE BY STIMULUS ACROSS ALL ATTEMPTS
Stimulus #Successful #Failed Failure
Pairings Pairings Rate
None (control) 28 13 0.32
Baby 24 1 0.04
Hammering 34 3 0.08
Helicopter 24 1 0.04
Saw 20 2 0.09
Total 130 20 0.13
We also partitioned subject failure rates by gender. While
Table V seems to indicate that female subjects were substan-
tially less likely to fail on the initial attempt than their male
counterparts, performing Barnard’s exact test on the subject
failure rates of men and women revealed that the perceived
difference between them is not statistically significant; Wald
statistic = 2.32, nuisance parameter = 0.98, p = 0.14.
TABLE V. SUBJECT FAILURE RATE BY GENDER, FIRST ATTEMPT ONLY
Gender #Successful #Unsuccessful Failure
Subjects Subjects Rate
Male 86 16 0.16
Female 41 4 0.09
C. Task Completion Times
Table VI shows average completion times in successful
trials for subjects under each stimulus. After applying a
conservative Bonferroni correction to account for four pairwise
comparisons, there is no statistically significant difference
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TABLE VI. AVG TIMES (SEC) FOR SUCCESSFUL PAIRING
Stimulus Mean Standard DF wrt t-value p
Time Deviation control wrt control
None 34.41 13.78 – – –
Baby 31.13 10.06 63 0.97 0.35
Hammering 28.82 9.76 74 1.84 0.07
Helicopter 31.33 13.13 63 0.81 0.39
Saw 38.45 17.15 60 0.90 0.38
in completion times between the control condition and each
stimulus.
Table VII shows Cohen’s d and its 95% confidence interval,
for subject completion times under each of the stimuli when
compared to the control condition. The effect sizes of the
stimuli are not statistically significant from 0 since each of
the confidence intervals contains 0.
TABLE VII. COHEN’S d AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS ON
SUBJECT COMPLETION TIMES BETWEEN CONTROL AND STIMULI
Stimulus Cohen’s d 95% Confidence Interval
wrt control wrt control
None (control) - –
Baby 0.27 -4.00 to 4.29
Hammering 0.47 -3.80 - 3.66
Helicopter 0.23 -4.04 - 5.48
Saw -0.27 -4.54 - 6.89
As with subject failure rates, we also examined subjects’
completion times for successful pairing attempts by gender.
The results are displayed in Table VIII. A pairwise t-test shows
that the observed differences are not statistically significant
(t(148) = 1.23, p = 0.22).
TABLE VIII. AVG TIMES (SEC) FOR SUCCESSFUL PAIRING BY
GENDER
Gender Mean Standard
Time Deviation
Male 30.63 10.92
Female 33.23 13.85
V. LESSONS LEARNED
As mentioned above, some subjects participated in the
experiment in pairs. We had not explicitly forbidden this
since doing so in an unattended setting would be impossible.
We ignored the data of such participant pairs, see Section
IV-A. A few subjects also tried the experiment more than
once on different Bluetooth devices (presumably to earn the
participation reward multiple times), and we had to visually
identify and discard their data.
Furthermore, a few subjects did not understand how to pair
two devices using Bluetooth, or were unsure what they were
supposed to do in general. This illustrates one drawback with
our experiment design - there was no option to replay the
instructions, nor was there a set of more detailed instructions
for participants who were unfamiliar with the Bluetooth func-
tionality of their devices. Since our experiment was unattended,
there was no way to tell the cause of task failure in real time,
or to help the subject if needed, until the recording of the
subject’s trial was viewed.
Interestingly, quite a few subjects had trouble following
the instructions of the proxy to enter their email address on
a virtual keyboard that was projected onto the touch-sensitive
Smartboard. Up to this point, the Smartboard had only served
as a (completely passive) projection wall, and subjects may
have been surprised that it could also be used as an input
device.
Our experiments were conducted during the academic year
while the term was in session. During that time, even though
the area where recruitment posters were placed experienced
heavy foot traffic, our prominently placed signs did not attract
as many subjects in a short period of time (1-2 weeks) as we
had expected. Therefore, in order to gain a sufficient number of
subjects, the experiment lasted about 6 weeks with some short
breaks when recruitment posters were removed. These short
breaks actually proved useful, since we believe that periodic
appearance and re-appearance of recruitment posters motivated
additional participants.
In retrospect, video surveillance of the experimental setup
proved invaluable, both for actual security purposes and for
being able to later correct experimental lapses.
VI. DISCUSSION OF OBSERVED EFFECTS
The introduction of several types of peripheral audio noise
did not appear to interfere with the completion of the task of
Bluetooth pairing. In fact, collected data shows a significant
decrease in failure rates for every stimulus, with no statistically
significant difference in the failure rate between different
noise stimuli. In cases of baby crying and helicopter’s rotors
spinning, there was only a single failure across 25 attempts, as
opposed to the control case, where every third attempt resulted
in failure, as shown in Table I.
This result, while initially unexpected, is actually consistent
with the Brain Arousal Model of [24] as well as the results of
[19], [15], [16]. Our experiment has a single, centrally-located
source and a low event rate, so it would be reasonable to expect
noise to have a positive effect on successful task completion
rates [19], [15]. Audio signals in our study came from the
center of participants’ area of attention and not the periphery,
i.e., the Smartboard and participants’ smartphones were in
front of them. This suggests that noise caused participants to
narrow their focus of attention [16], which might be conducive
to better task performance. Nevertheless, our study is novel
in the context of security-critical tasks, since, by its very
nature, the process of Bluetooth device pairing is significantly
shorter in duration than the attention-intensive vigilance tasks
discussed in related literature.
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VII. LIMITATIONS
We readily acknowledge that the study described in this
paper, although the first of its kind, has certain shortcomings
and limitations, detailed below.
A. Subjects
We experimented with a narrow subject group, dominated
by young and tech-savvy college students. This is a direct
consequence of the specific campus location of our unattended
setup. Replicating it in a non-academic setting (e.g., an office
building) would be possible and useful. However, passive
recruitment of a really diverse group of participants is only
possible in a truly public space with a high volume of traffic,
e.g., a stadium, a shopping mall, a movie theater or a concert
hall. On the other hand, placing our unattended experiment
setup in any of such settings would be extremely challenging.
First, our setup involved specialized and expensive equipment
whose security would be difficult to ensure in a very public
space. Second, high-traffic public spaces tend to be have lots
of background or ambient noise which would interfere with
the stimuli in our experiments.
As already mentioned, the nature of our location also had
a skewed impact on the gender breakdown of our subjects.
Since the experiment was set up in the Computer Science and
Engineering section of a large university campus, the majority
of the passers-by were male. Because of this, we were unable
to collect sufficient data in a realistic time frame to examine the
effects of each individual stimulus on subjects of each gender.
One potential problem with our subjects is that young
people are in general more sensitive to noise than older adults
[25]. It is quite conceivable that older and/or technologically
non-adept people4 would react differently to our noise stimuli.
Finally, recall that our experimental setup required the
subject to interact with both visual and audio queues from
the proxy experimenter and the environment. Because of this,
an ideal subject would have no substantial hearing or visual
impairment. However, due to the unattended nature of our
experiment, we could not proactively rule out such subjects
(e.g., by specifying restrictions in the recruitment posters)
without giving away the nature of our experiment. Doing so
would have created an initial expectation for subjects who
fit our criteria, which could adversely influence accuracy of
collected data. Therefore, during later review of each video-
recorded experiment, we had to verify that there were no
participants with obvious visual and/or hearing impairments.
B. Diversity of Stimuli
We experimented with four stimuli through a subjective
process of elimination, with the intention of getting as many
diverse noise types as we could rigorously test, that were
annoying to the listener in varying degrees. With respect to
diversity, we classified sounds in three ways:
1) Continuous or discrete
2) Regular or irregular
3) Human-generated or synthetic/mechanical
4Since people who are new to, or unfamiliar with, a specific technological
task would naturally be more nervous or tense when performing it.
One reason for settling on such a small number of stimuli was
due to the combination of (1) the location of the experiment,
and (2) placement of study recruitment posters. Although
posters were placed in a high-traffic zone, outside the building
where the experiments took place, the same people (mostly
students) tend to walk by every day due to the regularity of
campus life, e.g., classes begin and end at the same time and at
the same place. Consequently, although we were able to attract
147 subjects, the rate of participation decreased markedly over
time and ceased completely after 6 weeks. As it turned out,
147 was just enough for four stimuli as well as the control
condition. An additional stimulus would have needed around
25 new subjects; that proved impossible under the conditions
of our study.5
Despite this constraint, we selected the four stimuli to be
as diverse as possible:
• Baby crying was a continuous, irregular, human-generated
sound
• Helicopter rotors was a continuous, regular, mechanical
sound
• Hammering was a discrete, regular mechanical sound, and
• Circular saw was a continuous, irregular mechanical
sound
The most obvious discrete, human-generated stimulus – talk-
ing – was intentionally omitted, since it would have likely
caused confusion between the experiment instructions and the
stimulus.
C. Insufficiently Security-Critical Task
We suspect that most participants were unaware, ahead of
time, of the purpose and details of our experiment. However,
during the experiment they clearly understood that the task
at hand was Bluetooth-based pairing of their smartphone with
some other (our) device. Consequently, from the participant’s
perspective, this task was unlikely to be perceived as being
truly security-critical; the device the subjects were asked to
connect to was obviously a prop, not a device the subject
owned.
In the same vein, device pairing is neither as security-
critical nor as pervasive (or frequent) as other tasks, such as
password or PIN entry for the purpose of Internet access or
PIN entry into an Automated Teller Machine (ATM). However,
experimenting with these more natural tasks is significantly
more difficult.
D. Synthetic Environment
Our unattended experiment setup is clearly very synthetic,
for several reasons: First, it is normally very quiet, unlike
many (perhaps most) common everyday settings. Second, it is
located indoors with no exposure to daylight, no air movement
and no temperature fluctuations. Third, the setup (as shown in
Figure 1) involves equipment that an average participant never
or rarely encounters in the real world, in particular, a touch-
sensitive Smartboard used as a means of both input and output,
and a unusual-looking companion projector.
5Of course, recruitment posters could have distributed better around campus.
However, experience shows that attracting participants from farther afield is
harder than from nearby locations, especially given the relatively meager
participation reward.
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E. Ideal Setting
Based on the above discussion, it is easy to see that the
ideal setting for our experiment would be one where:
• Demographics of participants is widely varied
• Participants are completely unaware of the experiment, at
least until it is over
• The environment is common/natural
• The task is truly security-critical
One trivial example of such an ideal setting is a bank ATM
located in a well-trafficked public space, with the security-
critical task being the PIN entry process. A modern ATM
incorporates all features needed for our type of experiments: a
keypad, a screen, a speaker (for visually impaired individuals),
and a video camera. A similar setting is encountered in
some automotive gas stations where the fuel pump includes
a keypad (used for PIN and/or Zip code entry), a screen and
a speaker; video cameras are usually located overhead. Yet
another example would be a setting with public Internet access
terminals, commonly found in airports and hotels, where the
security-critical task would be the log-in process to the Internet
provider.
In theory, in any of the above examples, large numbers
of diverse subjects can be seamlessly gathered without any
explicit recruitment, awareness of the experiment or reward
for participation. However, it is easy to see that conducting
experiments in these ideal settings would be physically, logis-
tically and ethically problematic.
VIII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Experiments described in this paper were fully authorized
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of our university, well
ahead of the actual commencement of the study. The level of
review was: Exempt, Category II. Further IRB-related details
are available upon request. We note that no sensitive data
was harvested during the experiments and minimal identifying
information was retained. In particular:
• As part of Bluetooth device pairing, participants were not
asked to select any secret PINs or passwords. Instead, the
6-digit PIN was generated on the computer hidden from
view and displayed on the Smartboard as well as their
smartphone; they were then asked to compare the two
PINs and confirm that they were identical.
• The hidden computer (iMac) used for pairing was peri-
odically flushed of all collected device pairings.
• No names, addresses, phone numbers or other identifying
information was collected from the participants.
• Although email addresses were solicited in order to
deliver the participation reward, they were erased very
soon thereafter.
• Video recordings of the experiments were (and still are)
kept for study integrity purposes. However, we plan is to
erase them before IRB expiration time.
Finally, with regard to safety, we maintained noise levels of
between 67 and 80 dB which is (especially for a very short
duration, i.e., less than a minute) generally considered safe for
people, as discussed earlier in Section III-B.
IX. FUTURE WORK
As the “human link” in security-critical tasks becomes
more popular in various settings, including those subject to
accidental or adversarial sensory input, a thorough evaluation
of usability in the context of such tasks becomes imperative.
This work took the first step by studying the effects of
unexpected audio noise on users performing wireless device
pairing.
An interesting next step would be to conduct a similar
experiment with various visual stimuli, that is, to model an
adversary who controls some aspect of the visual environment
of the experiment. The natural follow-on then would be to
investigate the effects of mixed audio-visual stimuli.
Our use of an unattended experiment led to several com-
plications that we had not anticipated. For example, we were
often confronted with multiple subjects simultaneously taking
part in the experiment or advising one another on how to
correctly complete the task at hand. A technical solution to
this problem would be an enclosed experimental area whose
access is restricted to entry by a single person only (e.g.,
through a controlled turnstile). Unfortunately, this would be
in violation of fire safety regulations. We therefore plan to
explicitly instruct participants that the experiment is intended
to be conducted by a single subject at a time, and to verify
and penalize non-compliance, e.g., by denying reward to non-
compliant subjects.
Alternatively, instead of discarding these results, in future
studies it may be worthwhile to consider and compare the
results of those collaborating subjects’ trials in the context of
all trials with multiple participants. Such a comparison was
beyond the scope of our initial experiment.
To proactively discourage multiple experiments by the
same subject with different Bluetooth devices we could explic-
itly advertise the fact that video recordings will be reviewed
and subjects who participate more than once will not receive a
reward. However, this would accentuate the fact that subjects
are on camera, which could potentially influence performance.
We feel that this experimental paradigm is valuable and
deserves further evaluation. One possible goal is to create
a new standard whereby large experiments with hundreds
of subjects can be conducted without posing a prohibitive
financial and/or logistical burden.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL TOOLS
This section overviews simple statistical tools utilized in
the analysis of collected data.
A. Statistical significance
A statement of statistical significance is a statement of
confidence that two sets of observations represent samples
taken from different populations. This claim is constructed
by comparing the probability that two sets of observations
could have been taken from the same population distribution.
The probability p of the two samplings being from the same
population is then evaluated against a low-threshold, α. If
p ≤ α, the result is said to be statistically significant, and one
could confidently claim that the two samples represent two
different populations. We fix the low-threshold at α = 0.05.
B. Barnard’s Exact Test
Barnard [26] specifies a method for testing independence of
rows and columns in a contingency table that takes into account
nuisance parameters, which are auxiliary parameters that may
not be of immediate interest, but instead have a direct impact
on the parameter(s) being evaluated. Barnard’s exact test seeks
to maximize the impact of any such nuisance parameters
in maximizing p, the likelihood that the two rows in the
contingency table are samples taken from the same population.
This means that the p values found by this test are worst-case
estimates, and are more suitable for extreme cases than similar
methods, and are at least as powerful in non-extreme cases. We
utilize Barnard’s exact test in the examination of subject failure
rates.
C. Paired t-tests
The t-test is a method for determining if the differences
between two data sets are statistically significant through the
examination of their mean and standard deviation. For popu-
lations that can be assumed to follow a normal distribution,
these two parameters are sufficient for constructing p. A t-test
is said to be paired if the two data sets consist of pairs of
matched units. We utilize pairwise t-tests in the examination
of subject completion times.
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D. Pairwise examination
In case of multiple comparisons, researchers can assign
an acceptable type I error α (false positive) either to each
individual comparison or jointly, across all comparisons. To
judge the results along a joint α, a significance level αn can be
chosen for each test, with n being the number of pairwise
comparisons performed. This corresponds to the so-called
Bonferroni correction [27].
APPENDIX B: UNATTENDED EXPERIMENT SETUP
Fig. 2. Bluetooth confirmation screen, from subject’s perspective
Fig. 3. Experimenter proxy giving video instructions
Fig. 4. Subject entering email address on Smartboard
Fig. 5. Post-experimental review of video recordings (separate office)
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